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PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION AND
CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS
John C. Fortier' and Norman J. Ornstein"
After September 11, the United States has been forced to consider the
possibility that terrorists might strike at the top leadership of our
government. United Flight 93, the fourth plane on September 11, was
likely headed for the Capitol building or the White House before it was
downed by the brave passengers who stormed the cockpit.' If terrorists
were to execute such an attack and kill or incapacitate the President and
Vice President, our country would, for the first time in our history, have
to resort to the Presidential Succession Act,2 which is a statute that many
have argued is of dubious constitutionality and unwise policy.
3
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1. News accounts of a media interview and later interrogation of Khalid Sheik
Mohammed, who was involved in the planning of the 9/11 attacks, indicate that the
Capitol was the most likely target; the White House was also considered as a target in
earlier planning. CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, THE CONGRESS 2, app. II at 34 (2003)
(referencing several interviews following the September 11 attacks), available at
http://www.continuityofgovernment.org/pdfs/FirstReport.pdf.
2. 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1) (2000).
3. See Temporary Filling of House of Representatives Vacancies During National
Emergencies: Hearing on H.J. Res. 67 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on the
Constitution, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter Temporary Filling Hearing], (statement of
M. Miller Baker), http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/udiciary/hju77900.000/hju77900
_0f.htm; see also Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession
Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 114-15 (1995); Steven G. Calabresi, The
Political Question of Presidential Succession, 48 STAN. L. REV. 155, 156 (1995). But see
John Manning, Not Proved: Some Lingering Questions About Legislative Succession to the
Presidency, 48 STAN. L. REV. 141 (1995) (asserting the proposition that the Presidential
Succession Act is constitutional). However, even Manning's case is not a positive one on
the key textual question of whether Article II's mention of "officer" limits Congress to
putting executive branch figures in a Presidential Succession Act; Manning argues the
negative case, that it is "not proved" that "officer" implies executive branch figures. Id. at
153.
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The main difficulties in the Act involve the inclusion of the Speaker of
the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate in the line of
succession. Many argue this provision is unconstitutional on its face, and
might produce confusion by elevating a legislative branch figure, perhaps
not of the same political party as the President, to the Presidency in a
time of crisis. 4 We share the constitutional and policy concerns raised by
others, and we favor, among other reforms, removing congressional
leaders from the line of succession. This paper, however, pursues a
different tack from others in that it explores the problems of the
Presidential Succession Act under the different scenarios for succession
laid out by the Constitution.
The Constitution not only gives Congress the power to deal with the
death of the President and Vice President, but also with their
"Removal," "Resignation," "Inability," and "fail[ure] to qualify" for
office. 5 In the three succession acts that have governed this country,
Congress has not made a clear distinction among the different kinds of
succession.6 Congress could have treated these instances as distinct types
• 7
warranting a succession plan tailored to the circumstance. For example,
it might have been wise for the Speaker of the House to become
President after the death of the President and Vice President.'
Alternatively, Congress could have the Secretary of State, rather than
4. Amar & Amar, supra note 3, at 127.
5. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1, cl. 6, amend. XX, § 3.
6. The Twentieth Amendment, ratified in 1933, explicitly permitted Congress to
deal with the failure to qualify, even though this situation might have been implicit in the
removal or resignation of a President. Id. amend. XX, § 3. The failure to qualify includes
a number of instances where there is no President-elect who may claim the Presidency,
leaving the office vacant when the term of the outgoing President expires. Id. art. II, § 1.
The current Presidential Succession Act uses the term "fail[ure] to qualify," but again
makes very little distinction between succession of this type and its other forms. See 3
U.S.C. § 19. It is true that the Presidential succession acts necessarily deal with the
question of Presidential incapacitation differently than that of death, removal, resignation
and failure to qualify, but only in the sense that it is implied that a President might return
to office after his disability is removed. Id. This is not so much a different treatment of
the case, but a recognition that there is one difference inherent in the nature of this kind of
incapacitation-that a President may return to exercise the duties of the office. It is useful
to note that there is no distinction made in the Presidential Succession Act as to who will
succeed the President in the case of incapacitation from the other forms or in any
requirements for notification as are found in the Twenty-fifth Amendment. See id.; see
also U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
7. Ensuring the Continuity of the United States Government: The Presidency: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter Presidency
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the Speaker, temporarily take over if a President and Vice President had
been incapacitated.9
By examining each of the cases separately, this paper makes clear that
Congress has the power to treat each type of succession separately.
Further, this paper adds clarity to the constitutional and policy aspects of
different forms of Presidential succession. In particular, it finds that in
several instances of succession, namely, resignation, incapacitation, and
impeachment, the inclusion of congressional leaders in the line of
succession is even more objectionable than in the case of death. In
addition, this paper distinguishes the case of a President who fails to
qualify. In such a case, unlike the others, it is clearly constitutional for
congressional leaders to be placed in the line of succession, and in certain
scenarios, it might be good policy for such leaders to be in the line.
I. CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS IN THE LINE OF SUCCESSION
Article II of the U.S. Constitution states:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his
Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and
Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice
President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case
of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the
President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then
act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.'
Congress is given the power to make a law to specify the line of
Presidential succession by statute." There are few restrictions on this
power, but these restrictions form the basis for constitutional objections
to the inclusion of congressional leaders in the line of succession. The
key term is "Officer," by which the Framers likely meant "Officer of the
United States,"'2 as James Madison argued in the First and Second
Congresses, 3 and as well known scholars persuasively argue today.'4
While Congress, the states, and other institutions may have their own
officers, "Officers of the United States" are federal executive branch
9. See id.
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
11. See id.
12. See Calabresi, supra note 3, at 163.
13. JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL
SUCCESSION 611 (1965).
14. See, e.g., Presidency Continuity Hearing, supra note 7 (statement of Akhil Amar),
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=914&wit-id=2603; see also Amar & Amar,
supra note 3, at 116.
2004]
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figures.' 5 Congressional leaders are not "Officers of the United States"
and are, thus, not eligible to be included in the line of succession.
6
The Constitution's requirement that those in the line of succession be
"Officers of the United States" was not followed in the first Presidential
Succession Act of 1792 nor in the current statute, which was enacted in
1947."7 Both included the Speaker of the House and the President pro
tempore of the Senate in the line. This textual argument against
including members of Congress in the line of succession, based on the
meaning of the term "Officer," is bolstered by a larger structural
argument.'8  Separation of powers recommends against allowing
Congress to pick its own leaders as the President, as the Framers had not
created a parliamentary system where the legislature selects the
executive.' 9
Despite what we believe is a compelling case that congressional leaders
should not be included in the line of succession, the law in this area has
alternated between succession by congressional leaders and Cabinet
succession. The First Congress was unable to agree on a succession act,"'
but the Second Congress ultimately passed controversial legislation that
placed only two congressional leaders, the President pro tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House, in the line of succession.2' The law
also provided that if one of these congressional leaders acted as
President, and there was sufficient time left in the term, there would be a
special election to fill the remainder of the Presidential term.22
The first succession act faced strong criticism in the second half of the
nineteenth century, as the country faced two troubling instances where
there was no one alive in the line of succession after the President. In
1881, President James A. Garfield was shot by a disgruntled office
seeker. 23 He lay wounded for eighty days, much of the time unable to
carry out his duties.24 Only when President Garfield died in August did
Vice President Chester Arthur assume the duties of the Presidency. 25 For
a time, then-President Arthur had no Vice President in the line of
15. Amar & Amar, supra note 3, at 114-17.
16. See id.
17. FEERICK, supra note 13, at 57-63, 204-10.
18. Amar & Amar, supra note 3, at 118-19.
19. Id. at 118. There is, of course, an exception to this rule, as Congress is given a
role in selecting the President when the electoral college fails to produce a majority for
one of the candidates. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
20. FEERICK,supra note 13, at 58.
21. Id. at 58-60.
22. Id. at 59-60.
23. Id. at 118.
24. Id. at 125.
25. Id. at 128-29.
[Vol. 53:993
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succession because without the benefit of the Twenty-fifth Amendment,
adopted years later, there was no way to fill a vacancy in the Vice
Presidency until the next Presidential election. In addition, the Senate
had not chosen a President pro tempore, and the House had not chosen a
26Speaker. President Arthur, upon taking the oath of office, recognized
that there was no one in the line of succession, so he called a special
session of the Senate, which on October 13 elected David Davis, an
independent, as President pro tempore." The country went nearly a
month with no one in the line of succession."' This episode led to calls for
reform of the Presidential Succession Act, but no action. Eerily, a similar
situation arose four years later during President Grover Cleveland's first
term, when his Vice President, Thomas Hendricks, died in office very
early in the term. Again there was no President pro tempore or Speaker
of the House for a time.29
These incidents led to a major congressional debate over reforming the
Presidential Succession Act. During this debate, Congress rehashed
many of the issues it had discussed in the First and Second Congresses;
particularly, it debated the constitutionality of the eligibility of members
of Congress to be in the line of succession."' Also, on the policy side,
there was concern that congressional leaders might be of another party
than the President.3 ' David Davis was elected as an independent
President pro tempore, sitting directly behind the Republican Arthur for
over three years of his term.32 At this time, the arguments on the side of
Cabinet succession won the day. Under the Presidential Succession Act
of 1886, Congress removed congressional leaders from the line of
succession entirely, and placed the Cabinet officers directly behind the
President and the Vice President.33
The era of Cabinet succession continued for over sixty years. The
death of President Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman's succession to
the Presidency would herald the third Presidential Succession Act, which
is still in effect today. President Truman, in a 1945 speech, outlined his
belief that a President should not appoint his own successor. 4 In this
26. Id. at 130-31.
27. Id. at 131-32.
28. Id. at 130-32.
29. Id. at 141.
30. Id. at 144.
31. Id. at 131.
32. Id. at 132.
33. Id. at 143.
34. Id. at 205. The Presidential Succession Act of 1886, with its Cabinet succession
scheme, had specified that next in the Presidential succession line after the Vice President
would be the Secretary of State, who like all of the Cabinet would have been appointed by
the President. Id.
2004]
Catholic University Law Review
speech, President Truman also stressed the importance of elected
leadership.35
The Truman speech spurred Congress into action and, ultimately, to
the passage of the current Succession Act. The 1947 Act, which closely
followed President Truman's proposal, is a hybrid between the first two
succession acts, putting both congressional leaders and Cabinet officers
in the line of succession. But Congressional leaders are favored over
Cabinet officers in two ways. First, they precede the Cabinet in order of
succession.37 Second, if a Cabinet member becomes President because
everyone else above that person in the line of succession is killed, then
Congress can elect new leadership and either a new Speaker or a new
President pro tempore would then be able to bump out the Cabinet
member who holds the Presidency.
Congressional leaders, then, have been in the line of succession for
much, but not all, of the Nation's history, even though this system is of
dubious constitutionality. For both constitutional and policy reasons, we
favor a return to a purely executive branch line of succession. But in this
paper, we note that deliberation about the role of congressional leaders
in the line of succession might usefully be broken down into several
parts. Because our succession acts have tended to treat the several types
of succession in more or less the same fashion, constitutional and policy
reasons for keeping leaders of Congress out of the line of succession have
been obscured. The following sections will examine the constitutional
and policy implications of having congressional leaders in the line of
succession in the case of death, resignation, impeachment and removal,
and inability or failure to qualify.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 208-09; see also 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2000).
37. 3 U.S.C. § 19.
38. FEERICK, supra note 13, at 208-09; Joseph B. Kallenbach, The New Presidential
Succession Act, 41 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 931, 934 (1947), http://links.jstor.org/sici?
sici=00030554%28194710%2941%3A5 %3C931%3ATNPSA %3E2.0.CO %3B2. On the
bumping procedure, several scholars have noted its questionable constitutionality.
Leaving aside the question of the propriety of including congressional leaders in the line of
succession, one major argument against the bumping procedure is that it violates the
language of Article 1I that the successor shall act as President until "the Disability be
removed, or a President shall be elected." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. The argument is that
the acting President shall serve indefinitely until one of the two listed conditions is met. In
the case of an incapacitated President, the acting President shall serve until the disability
of the President is removed. Otherwise, the acting President will cease to act as President
only after a Presidential election, either a special election which is allowed by the
Constitution, or by the next general election. The bumping procedure provides that an
acting President shall serve until another acting President bumps him or her. see RUTH
SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 175 (1951); Amar & Amar, supra note 3, at 135.
[Vol. 53:993
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A. Death
When the average person thinks of Presidential succession, he or she
thinks of the death of a President. The Constitution provides for the
Vice President to succeed the President, but if both the President and
Vice President die, the Presidential Succession Act is triggered. 9 The
constitutional argument against including congressional leaders in the
line of succession is straightforward. As congressional leaders are not
"Officers of the United States," they are not eligible to be successors to
the President.
41
Additional arguments are compelling. Structural concerns about the
separation of powers make congressional leaders a problematic choice.
Further, the Constitution describes the successor as "acting" as
President, but remaining in the office that he or she holds while assuming
42the duties of the Presidency. If this is what the Framers intended, then
it would be impossible for a congressional leader to hold his or her post
and act as President, as the Constitution forbids holding office in both
the legislative and executive branches.43
As a policy matter, the chief objection to congressional succession in
the case of the death of the President and Vice President is that it
undermines stability in the transfer of power. First, there is the
possibility that a congressional leader would be of the opposite party of
the President.4 In that case, a new President would likely reject the
policies or personnel of the current administration. Stability would be
undermined especially in the case of a terrorist attack that requires a
foreign policy response, as a change in party could make a swift response
very difficult.
The potential for a switch in the party of the President might tempt
foreign enemies or zealous domestic partisans to attempt to change the
party in control of the White House by killing the President and Vice
President. President Garfield's assassin infamously cried that he had
killed the President in order to elevate Chester A. Arthur, the "stalwart"
41candidate, to the Presidency. If we had a Cabinet succession system, a
change in party or philosophy would be less likely.
Second, even if the Speaker of the House is philosophically compatible
with the President, the Speaker has not been part of the President's
administration, and presumably would have less knowledge of the
39. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; 3 U.S.C. § 19(a).
40. Amar & Amar, supra note 3, at 121.
41. FEERICK, sitpra note 13, at 207-08.
42. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1.
43. Amar & Amar, supra note 3, at 120-21.
44. FEERICK, supra note 13, at 131.
45. Id. at 118. Stalwart was a branch of the Republican Party. Id.
2004]
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intimate details of the President's foreign policy and other matters.
After the Vice President, the Secretary of State would be most capable to
take over the Presidency without a significant transition or change in
policy. The constitutional argument against including congressional
leaders in the line of succession along with the policy argument that
Cabinet succession better preserves the continuity of party and policy of
an administration are compelling reasons to consider removing
congressional leaders from the line and returning to Cabinet succession.
But the case of the death of a President does not illustrate the
difficulties of having congressional leaders in the line of succession as
well as several other types of Presidential succession. In the case of
resignation, removal, and incapacity, the case for Cabinet succession is
stronger.
B. Resignation
In most ways, resignation resembles the case of succession after death,
as the Offices of the President and/or Vice President are vacated without
the action of others.46 President Richard Nixon is the only President to
have resigned. The presence of congressional leaders in the line of
succession, however, might change a President's calculation about
resignation.49 If the Vice Presidency were vacant, a President who was
contemplating resignation might think twice if the potential successor
was a member of the opposite political party.49 If Gerald Ford had never
been confirmed as Vice President and President Nixon was faced with
resignation, would he have fought to the bitter end so that Democratic
Speaker of the House Carl Albert would not have become President?' °
Two situations where a sitting President might contemplate resignation
are scandal and illness. 5' Faced with a serious scandal a President may
46. Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6, with id. art. II, § 4.
47. RICHARD NIXON, WHITE HOUSE, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/historyl
presidents/rn37.html (last visited May 12, 2004). President Nixon, facing the prospect of
impeachment and removal, resigned on August 9, 1974. Two Vice Presidents have
resigned. Spiro Agnew, facing scandal, resigned on October 10, 1973. Agnew, Spiro
Theodore, 1918-1996, in BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESS, at http://bioguide.congress.govlscripts/biodisplay.pl?index=AO00059. John C.
Calhoun resigned on December 28, 1832 in order to serve in the Senate. Calhoun, John
Caldwell, 1782-1850, in BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OFTHE UNITED STATES CONGRESS,
at http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.p?index=C000044 (last visited May 12,
2004).
48. JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 214-15 (2d ed. 1992).
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 17-22, 214-15 (explaining how President Eisenhower contemplated
resigning due to health concerns and how President Nixon ultimately did resign due to the
Watergate scandal).
1000 [Vol. 53:993
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consider resigning.52 But if, absent a Vice President, the Speaker of the
House is of the opposite party, the President might stretch out the period
of scandal because he would not want to turn over power to someone of
the other party or even to a leader of the same party who may be less in
accord with the aims of the administration than a Cabinet member."
Alternatively, the consideration of resignation might be tied to
14Presidential illness. If a President found him or herself too weak to
carry out the duties of the office and believed the condition to be
permanent, then that President might consider resigning for the good of
the country." If the Vice Presidency were vacant, then a President might
choose not to turn over the reigns of power to a Speaker of the other
party or one not in sync with the policies of the President. This
resistance to resignation might lead to a debilitated President.
Moreover, if the Vice Presidency were vacant as in this scenario, there
would be no one to trigger the provisions of Section 4 of the Twenty-fifth
Amendment and take over against the wishes of a President unable to
56function. This would leave our country in a situation vulnerable to
attack.
One additional possibility would be that a gravely ill President would
hope to appoint a new Vice President under Section 2 of the Twenty-fifth
Amendment. But if there were a Speaker of the House of the opposite
party, he or she might block the nomination, knowing the President was
ill and might die or resign and leave the Presidency to the Speaker. 7
From a crassly partisan perspective, the incentive for a Speaker would be
to keep the Vice Presidency vacant, and presumably, as the Speaker was
elected by the majority party in the House, he or she might have the
votes to do so. If the Secretary of State were next in line, then Congress
would not have the same self-interested motive to resist confirming a
new Vice President, as there would be no partisan gain in doing so.
52. See, e.g., JEFFREY D. SCHULTZ, PRESIDENTIAL SCANDALS 386 (2000) (noting
President Nixon's resignation on August 9, 1974).
53. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 214.
54. See id. at 17-22 (describing the health difficulties President Eisenhower suffered
while President, i.e., heart attack, surgery to remove a nonmalignant obstruction of his
small intestine, and stroke, which caused him to contemplate resignation).
55. See id. (recanting how a distraught President Eisenhower reportedly told his
confidants: "[i]f I cannot attend to my duties, I am simply going to give up this job. Now
that is all there is to it.").
56. Id. at 206.
57. See id. at 195 (explaining that if a "vacancy in the Vice Presidency exists, [and] the
President should die, resign, or be removed, the Speaker, upon his resignation from
Congress, would fill out the presidential term by reason of the 1947 succession statute").
2004]
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C. Impeachment and Removal
The line of succession also applies to the case when the Vice
Presidency is vacant and the President is removed from office.6 We have
had two instances in our history that approached this scenario in theS 59
presidencies of Andrew Johnson and Richard Nixon. In 1865, after the
assassination of President Abraham Lincoln, Vice President Andrew
Johnson assumed the Presidency, leaving the Vice Presidency vacant.
60
Before the ratification of the Twenty-fifth Amendment in 1967, there
was no mechanism for filling a vacancy in the Vice Presidency. President
Johnson was impeached by the House and came within one vote of being
removed from office by the Senate.6' President Johnson, originally a
Democrat, had run on a ticket with the Republican Lincoln, but was
viewed as a member of the opposition party by the radical Republicans
in Congress. 6' Had Congress removed President Johnson, Benjamin
Wade, the Senate President pro tempore, who had voted for Johnson's
removal, would have succeeded him. 63
In President Nixon's case, Vice President Spiro Agnew had resigned,S 61
and some in Congress foresaw the demise of President Nixon himself.
A group of representatives encouraged Carl Albert, then Speaker of the
House, to hold up the confirmation of Gerald Ford for Vice President, so
that Congress could then remove President Nixon and elevate theS 61
Democrat Albert to the Presidency. While Albert did not seem to have
seriously entertained such a strategy, there were many who did.66 The
seriousness of the effort is evidenced by the fact that Ted Sorensen,
former aide to Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, was
tasked to write memos planning for the transition into office of an Albert
67
administration .
58. Seeid. at 213-15.
59. See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
60. SCHULTZ, supra note 52, at 124.
61. Id. at 125, 133 (explaining that President Johnson survived three different
impeachment charges by one vote each).
62. Id. at 122-23, 129-30. In an effort to reach out to Democrats who had been loyal
to the Union during the Civil War, Republican President Abraham Lincoln chose Andrew
Johnson, a southern Democrat, to be his running mate during Lincoln's bid for reelection.
Id. Johnson had demonstrated his loyalty by being the only southern legislator to remain
in office when the South seceded from the Union. Id. Johnson had been a Senator from
Tennessee when the Civil War began. Id.
63. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 214.
64. See id. at 215.
65. Gerald R. Ford, The Path Back to Dignity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1998, at 15.
66. See id.
67. Theodore Sorensen, Remarks at the Council for Excellence in Government's
Workshop on Covering the Transition from Campaigning to Governing (June 27, 2000)
1002 [Vol. 53:993
Presidential Succession and Congressional Leaders
Having congressional leaders in the line of succession in the case of the
removal of the President might, in extreme cases, encourage Congress to
remove a President of the other party just so the Presidency would switch
parties. When a President is truly deserving of removal from office,
Congress would be less self-interested if the Cabinet were next in the line
of succession. Congress would then limit itself to determining when the
President is to be removed, without the prospect of partisan gain from
the removal. Again, Cabinet succession is more appropriate in this case.
If others in the Cabinet share in the corruption of the President,
Congress could remove as many Cabinet members as it saw fit.
D. Presidential Incapacitation
If the President is incapacitated and the Vice Presidency is vacant, then
the Presidential Succession Act calls on the Speaker of the House to
stand in as acting President.6 This scenario raises a number of thorny
questions. First, a Speaker of the House would have to resign from the
Speakership and the House to act as President.69  Second, the
constitutional and statutory requirements that a Speaker resign might
cause the Speaker to decline to take the Presidency. This declination
would raise troubling questions: How would the Speaker decline?
Would there be a timeframe for accepting the post?
The current Act allows for a Speaker of the House or President pro
tempore of the Senate to bump out a Cabinet member who is serving as
President. ° Would a Speaker who declines the Presidency be able to
later change his or her mind and bump out a Cabinet member? Third, if
a Speaker were to replace an incapacitated President, the possibility that
he or she would be a member of the opposite political party raises many
difficulties. The Speaker, as acting President, would have access to all of
the classified and confidential information of the incapacitated
President's administration. The Speaker, as acting President, would be
able to fire all of the White House staff and political appointees.
Fourth, imagine the case of a severely wounded President who fades in
and out of capacity. The Presidential Succession Act makes it explicit
that the Speaker of the House or President pro tempore of the Senate
must resign as Speaker or President pro tempore and from his or her seat
in Congress.7 ' Even if the Presidential Succession Act did not specify it,
(transcript available online at http://www.excelgov.org/displayContent.asp?NewsltemlD=
1718&Keyword=prnwTransition).
68. 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1) (2000).
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1).
70. 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(2).
71. Id. § 19(a)(1), (b). Section 19(a)(1) provides:
20041 1003
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the Constitution forbids simultaneously holding offices in the executive
and legislative branches." Incapacitation of a President poses a dilemma
for congressional leaders in the line of succession, because if they were to
become acting President, they might be displaced by the President once
the President regains his or her health.73 In the meantime, they will be
left without a position in the Congress. Constitutionally, it would not
pose a problem for the Secretary of State, as a Cabinet member, to
exercise the powers of the Presidency, and then relinquish those powers
while retaining the position of Secretary of State. The Presidential
Succession Act, however, does require that the Cabinet Secretary resign
• 74
from office in order to act as President. This provision of the Act is not
constitutionally required as there is no bar to holding two offices in the
71executive branch of government . Moreover, while losing his or her post
might be a small disincentive for a Cabinet member to step in for a
President, the recovered President could reappoint the Cabinet member
(with Senate confirmation or, for a time, as a recess appointment).
Because a Cabinet member still serves at the whim of the President, who
might at any time fire him or her, refusing to act as President would not
protect that Cabinet member from being fired by the President.
Contrast this situation to one in which the Speaker assumed the
Presidency. Here a recovered President could neither reappoint the
person as a member of the House or Speaker of the House, nor could he
or she remove a Speaker who chose not to act as President.
7 6
Additionally, the problem of an incapacitated President with a vacant
Vice Presidency might cause a Speaker to consider not acting as
If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to
qualify, there is neither a President nor Vice-President to discharge the powers
and duties of the office of President, then the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker and as Representative in
Congress, act as President.
Id. § 19(a)(1) (emphasis added); see also William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana,
The Realities of Presidential Succession: The Emperor Has No Clones, 75 GEO. L.J. 1389,
1436-37 (1987).
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 ("[A]nd no Person holding any Office under the
United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.").
73. 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(2).
74. Id. § 19(d)(3). ("The taking of the oath by an individual specified in the list in
paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be held to constitute his resignation from the office
by virtue of the holding of which he qualifies to act as President.").
75. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (preventing the holding of office in the legislative
and executive branch, but not the holding of two offices within the executive branch).
76. Id. § 2, cls. 4-5 (describing the procedure for filling vacancies and electing officers
in the House of Representatives); id. § 3, cls. 2, 5 (describing the procedure for filling
vacancies and electing officers in the Senate).
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President even when the President is clearly incapacitated. This would
introduce delay and uncertainty into an already unstable situation.
The Presidential Succession Act also raises practical questions. It
seems plausible that a person in the line of succession might decline to
serve as acting President, but how would this be done? Would the
Speaker issue a letter stating that he has refused the acting Presidency,
passing the office off to the next in line? 7  Would the country wait as the
Speaker mulled over his options?
Furthermore, the Presidential Succession Act allows for a Speaker or
President pro tempore to bump a Cabinet member who has assumed the
Presidency . If the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore
refused the Presidency in an instance when the President was
incapacitated for a short period of time, then the Secretary of State
would act as President (under the cloud that the congressional leaders
might bump him or her out of office at any time).
Additionally, imagine if the Speaker from the opposite party of the
President took over the Presidency, as in the fictional scenario depicted
in a recent set of episodes of the television show The West Wing.7 9 As
acting President, the former Speaker would be able to fire the White
House staff and political appointees. Even more troubling, he or she
could access all confidential memos concerning delicate foreign policy
matters and others with a more political character. Should an interloper
from the other branch of government, and perhaps from the opposing
party, temporarily take over for a President who might be out for a
relatively short period of time?
Finally, consider the case of a President who fades in and out of
capacity. This is not a remote possibility. Both Presidents Garfield and
Wilson had periods of greater and lesser lucidity during their times of
incapacitation. 0  President Eisenhower also had several significant
medical events."' Consider the following scenario: A Speaker takes over
77. See 3 U.S.C. § 20. Section 20 provides:
The only evidence of a refusal to accept, or of a resignation of the office of
President or Vice President, shall be an instrument in writing, declaring the
same, and subscribed by the person refusing to accept or resigning, as the case
may be, and delivered into the office of the Secretary of State.
Id.
78. 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(2).
79. John C. Fortier, The West Wing and Presidential Succession: Fact or Fiction, ROLL
CALL, Sept. 24, 2003, 2003 WL 7692126; see also FEERICK, supra note 48, at 47: Gregory
F. Jacob, 25, 7 GREEN BAG 2d 23, 31 (2001). The West Wing is a television series that
portrays a behind-the-scenes look at a fictional Presidential administration.
80. FEERICK, supra note 13, at 123-25, 165-74.
81. See generally ROBERT E. GILBERT, THE MORTAL PRESIDENCY 74-141 (1998)
(recounting President Eisenhower's health history and its effect on the Presidency).
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for a President who is incapacitated. Later, the President could recover
and resume the duties of the office, thereby displacing the Speaker, who
had resigned from Congress to act as President. In the meantime, a new
Speaker of the House could have been elected. If the President suffers a
relapse, then this new Speaker would become President, and so on. This
would be a severe form of instability in the White House.
A similar case with a Secretary of State taking over, without the
Presidential Succession Act's requirement to resign, would not result in
such chaos. The Secretary of State might step in temporarily, but step
back to the Secretary of State position, while being able to fill in again if
the President faded out of capacity.
E. Failure to Qualify
The Twentieth Amendment gives Congress the power to specify who
shall serve as President82 in the case where no one qualifies to be
President when a new Presidential term begins on January 20. 3 The
most likely scenario for a failure to qualify is an election controversy.
The 1876 election, for example, was not fully resolved until just a few
days before the Presidential term was about to begin. 4 One might also
contemplate a situation where no candidate receives a majority of the
electoral college, throwing the election to Congress, and Congress
deadlocking on a choice. Finally, one should consider the case of a
terrorist attack that kills the President-elect and Vice President-elect
shortly before they take office. In all of these cases, Cabinet succession is
impossible, because the new Cabinet (that of the President-elect) is
officially nominated and confirmed only after the new President takes
office.
The terms of the exiting President and Vice President end at noon on
Inauguration Day. 5 If congressional leaders were removed from the
82. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3. Section 3 states:
If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the President
elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become President. If a
President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of
his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice
President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified; and
the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect
nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as
President. or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such
person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have
qualified.
Id.
83. Id. § 1.
84. Norman J. Ornstein, Three Disputed Elections, in AFTER THE PEOPLE VOTE 41
(Walter Berns ed., 1992). Then, Inauguration Day was in March.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.
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current line of succession, this would leave only the Cabinet of the
previous administration in the line of succession. This would lead to the
perverse result that an election controversy or terrorist attack would give
the Presidency to the Secretary of State of the prior administration.
The old Cabinet would likely reflect an earlier political reality. It is
possible, under these circumstances, that the Secretary of State of the
previous administration might have been nominated and confirmed eight
years before. The prior administration might have been discredited, and
the President might have decided not to run for office. The election
controversy or preinauguration attack would then return a member of
that administration to office. Alternatively, the outgoing President might
have been soundly defeated for office, but if an attack killed the
President-elect and Vice President-elect, the Secretary of State of the
defeated President might become President.
In the case where a President is unable to qualify for office on January
20, it would not make sense for Congress to rely strictly on Cabinet
succession. Here there are a number of measures that Congress could
specify in the Presidential Succession Act. Among these possibilities is
to include congressional leaders in the line of succession. It would be an
improvement over simple Cabinet succession from a policy standpoint,
and it is permissible, constitutionally, because the language of the
Twentieth Amendment, authorizing Congress to provide for the
circumstance where there is a "fail[ure] to qualify, 86 is different from
that in Article II and contains no mention of the limitation of successors
to "Officer[s]. 87
The major advantage of including congressional leaders in the line of
succession in the case where there is no President who qualifies on
Inauguration Day is that all members of the House of Representatives
and one-third of the senators are recently elected and therefore reflect a
current sentiment of the people. Contrast this with the outgoing Cabinet,
whose connection to the recent Presidential election is remote at best.
It would also be constitutionally permissible for Congress to include
congressional leaders in the line of succession in the case that there is no
President on January 20.8 The Twentieth Amendment, which authorizes
Congress to specify who will be President if no one qualifies, does not
use the term "Officer" found in Article 11.89 It reads: "Congress may by
law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice
President elect shall have qualified." 90 This language does not in any way
86. Id. § 3.
87. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
88. See Presidency Continuity Hearing, supra note 7.
89. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3; see also id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
90. Id. amend. XX, § 3.
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limit the person whom Congress may specify to act as President.]' The
person specified to take over in the case of a failure to qualify need not
be an "Officer" of the United States, nor does that person need to hold
any position in the government at all. 92
There are potential problems with including Congress in the line of
succession if the President-elect and Vice President-elect fail to qualify
on January 20; however, in some scenarios, the alternatives are not very
palatable. 3 One set of potential problems arises if there is an election
controversy. In the event of a controversy or deadlock that precludes the
selection of a President before Inauguration Day, current law allows the
Speaker of the House to act as President until either a President or Vice
President qualifies for office.94 This means the members of the House of
Representatives, who are involved in counting the electors from the
electoral college or in directly selecting the President in the absence of a
majority in the electoral college, would know that if no resolution of the
election occurred, their own Speaker would act as President9
Take, for example, the 2000 election. If the dispute over the Florida
electors had persisted, and Congress was unable to resolve disputed sets
of electors sent by the Supreme Court of Florida, the Governor, the State
legislature, etc., the controversy might have lasted until Inauguration
Day.96 If the electors were not chosen in time for inauguration, House
Speaker Dennis Hastert would have stepped in to act as President.97
From a purely partisan perspective, House Republicans might have
resisted resolving the Presidential dispute in Democratic candidate Al
Gore's favor, had they known the Republican Hastert would take over
on January 20. Therefore, a conflict of interest exists between the
House's duties to properly count electors, resolve disputes, and announce
the selection of a new President before January 20.
In addition to a potential conflict of interest, there is another problem
with having congressional leaders in the line of succession in the case of
an election controversy that lasts until Inauguration Day. Because the
Speaker is unable to hold legislative and executive office simultaneously,
the Speaker must resign from Congress."  Again, consider the
hypothetical of the 2000 election controversy lasting until inauguration.
91. See id.
92. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
93. See Presidency Continuity Hearing, supra note 7.
94. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (a)(1) (2000).
95. Id. §§ 15, 19(a).
96. In the 1876 election, the contest was not resolved in Hayes' favor until two days
before the inauguration. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
97. See 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1).
98. 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1).
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If at noon on January 20 there was no President-elect, and Dennis
Hastert assumed the Presidency, then he would have continued acting as
President only until the election controversy was resolved.99 Three weeks
later, if the majority of electors voted for one candidate for President (or
for Vice President), or a deadlocked House or Senate elected a
President, if no candidate received a majority of the electoral votes, then
Hastert would have had to step aside""' and be left with no seat in
Congress.'" A Speaker or President pro tempore might be reluctant to
act as President under such conditions.
The case of the death of the President-elect and Vice President-elect
would not present the same difficulties."2 There would be no conflict of
interest on the part of a Congress involved in resolving an election
dispute, and a Speaker of the House would not take the office
temporarily, but would serve for the entire four-year term.1
3
Exclusion of congressional leaders from the line of Presidential
succession is not wholly attractive. For example, Cabinet line of
succession would mean that the Cabinet of the outgoing administration
would be next in the line of succession.'"' In addition to the problems
with this scenario mentioned earlier, it is common that many of the
Cabinet secretaries resign on, or in advance of, January 20.'0' Some leave
acting secretaries in their place, and as long as those secretaries have
been confirmed by the Senate (they are not career civil servants or recess
appointments), they would be in the line of succession.'(m In the case of a
terrorist attack occurring on Inauguration Day, there would be chaos
trying to figure out which Cabinet secretaries from the prior
administration were still in office and whether they had left acting
secretaries who were eligible to serve as President.' 7
Another option Congress could consider is to require that the outgoing
President remain in office until the election controversy is resolved. This
plan would have the advantage of ensuring stability in the Presidency and
would guarantee that someone with experience would be in place. But it
would again have an effect on the way that Congress resolves an election
controversy.
99. Id. § 19(c)(1).
100. See id.
101. Seeid. § 19(a)(1).
102. See Presidency Continuity Hearing, supra note 7.
103. 3 U.S.C. § 19(c).
104. See Presidency Continuity Hearing, supra note 7.
105. See John C. Fortier, President Michael Armacost?, 21 BROOKINGS REV. No. 4,
Fall 2003, at 33, 34.
106. See, e.g., id. at 33-36.
107. E.g., id. at 34.
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If, for example, there was an outgoing Democratic President, then
Democratic members of Congress would have an incentive to prevent
the resolution of an election controversy. This outgoing President could
be a discredited and defeated figure, and as the election controversy
might continue on indefinitely, the outgoing President could remain
President for up to another four-year term.'08 As a positive, the former
President does not face the dilemma that a Speaker of the House does in
deciding whether or not to resign from Congress. When the controversy
subsided, the outgoing President would leave office (unless, of course,
the outgoing President was determined to be the winner of an election
controversy, in which case, he or she would remain in office).
Another measure to consider in order to deal with the problem of an
attack on or prior to Inauguration Day that kills the President-elect or
the Vice President-elect is to establish a custom that the outgoing
President nominates the Cabinet choices of the incoming President
before noon on January 20.'09 The Senate could then confirm the choices
in advance of the inauguration ceremony. The reason for such a custom
would be that, even in the most expedited cases, an incoming President
takes the oath of office at noon on January 20, then officially nominates
his Cabinet, and the Senate, subsequently, confirms most of the
nominees later in the day, as hearings have been held in the days leading
up to the inauguration. " Even with this relatively efficient course of
events, there is still a gap of several hours when the new President has no
Cabinet. And it is just at this time that all of the important figures in
Washington gather at the inaugural ceremony. If terrorists struck at this
time, there would be chaos."' An early morning appointment by the
outgoing President and Senate confirmation of the Cabinet would allow
for some of the new Cabinet to avoid the inauguration ceremony and
improve the chances that a high level successor would be available if an
attack were to occur.'
2
To summarize the consequences of a President's failure to qualify, this
set of situations is quite different from other succession scenarios. The
constitutional language of the Twentieth Amendment does not require
that the successors be "Officers," and therefore congressional leaders
would be eligible to succeed to the Presidency." 3 Also, there are some
108. See Presidency Continuity Hearing, supra note 7.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. Id. ("The President-elect, the Speaker of the House, and the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate all typically attend the swearing-in ceremony, as do most Supreme
Court Justices and members of Congress. With all of these figures present, a catastrophic
attack at the inauguration would kill the top four in the line of succession.").
112. Id.
113. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3.
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circumstances where this might make sense from a policy perspective.
Surely, it would be preferable to strict Cabinet succession where the
outgoing Cabinet would fall next in the line." 4 However, there are other
options as well, and no choice is completely palatable for this scenario.
II. THE BUMPING OR SUPPLANTATION PROCEDURE
One additional provision of the Presidential Succession Act that
involves congressional leaders is the "bumping procedure."'"5  If the
Presidency passes to a Cabinet member, then a newly elected Speaker of
the House or a new President pro tempore of the Senate can replace a
Cabinet member who has been serving as President.' 6 Congress put this
provision into the 1947 succession act because of President Truman's
belief that elected officials should take priority over nonelected officials
in the line of succession.
' 7
In the event of a catastrophic attack that kills the President, Vice
President, and congressional leadership, the Secretary of State assumes
the duties of the Presidency.' Yet, whenever Congress elects a new
Speaker or President pro tempore, that new leader may "bump" the
Secretary of State." 9 The result would be three presidents within a short
span of time. Even more problematic, the Act does not specify that the
Speaker or President pro tempore needs to "bump" a Cabinet member
immediately.20 A situation may arise when a Cabinet member is acting
as President but lives under the threat of being bumped from the office
by congressional leaders at any time. Such a scenario would completely
undermine our system of separation of powers.
Several scholars have persuasively argued that this provision is
unconstitutional.' 2' Leaving aside the involvement of congressional
leaders in the line of succession, the "bumping" procedure goes against
the language of Article II that states that Congress may specify in law the
successor: "declaring which Officer shall then act as President, and such
Officer shall act accordingly until the Disability be removed, or a
President shall be elected.' 2 2 This language provides that Congress may
114. Presidency Continuity Hearing, supra note 7.
115. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
116. Presidency Continuity Hearing, supra note 7: Amar & Amar, supra note 3. at 135.
117. FEERICK, supra note 13, at 204-09.
118. 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(1) (2000).
119. See Presidency Continuity Hearing, supra note 7.
120. 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(1); see Presidency Continuity Hearing, supra note 7.
121. Amar & Amar, supra note 3, at 135-36; see also Temporary Filling Hearing, supra
note 3.
122. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. cl. 6 (emphasis added).
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specify a successor who shall serve until one of two conditions arises. 21
First, if the successor is serving due to a disability of the President, then
the successor's Presidency will cease when the disability is removed.'24
Second, Congress may choose to conduct a special election to fill the
remainder of the term."25 Such a provision was included in the first
succession act.'
26
This Article II language also allows for a successor to serve as
President until a new President is elected in a subsequent general
election.' 27 Nevertheless, the language of Article II is clear that short of
one of the two previously mentioned scenarios, the successor will remain
in office. 12  Therefore, the bumping procedure, whereby a Cabinet
member succeeds to the Presidency only to be subsequently bumped
from office by a Speaker or President pro tempore, violates this
provision. 129
III. PROBLEMS IN THE CONTINUITY OF CONGRESS AFFECT THE
PRESIDENTIAL LINE OF SUCCESSION
Finally, there is the extreme case where Presidential succession is
negatively impacted by the problems regarding the continuity of
Congress. 30 Imagine a scenario involving the deaths of the President,
Vice President, and most of the Congress, such as an attack at a State of
the Union Address. The Secretary of State would succeed as President,
but only until the election of a new Speaker of the House or new
President pro tempore of the Senate, under the "bumping provision" of
the Presidential Succession Act."' In such an extreme scenario it would
be difficult for Congress to operate in a normal fashion.132 If most of
Congress was killed in an unexpected disaster, the House of
Representatives, in particular, would face difficulty reconstituting itself.133
This is because the House of Representatives can fill its vacancies only
123. Id.
124. Id.; Amar & Amar, supra note 3, at 135-36.
125. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; Amar & Amar, supra note 3, at 133 n.125.
126. Presidential Succession Act of March 1, 1972, reprinted in FEERICK, supra note
48, app. C at 253.
127. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
128. Id.
129. Amar & Amar, supra note 3, at 135.
130. CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N. supra note 1, at 3-4.
131. Arnar & Amar, supra note 3, at 135.
132. CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 1, at 8.
133. Id. at 3.
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by special election,14 and therefore, it could be many months until all the
vacancies were filled. ' In recent years, it has taken an average of over• 136
four months to fill House vacancies.
After a catastrophic attack, the House of Representatives would face
one of two scenarios. First, it might not be able to meet at all because
the Constitution defines a quorum as a majority of the body. 37 This
would mean that no new Speaker could be elected for months.'3" The
Secretary of State would remain President until either a new Speaker or
new President pro tempore took the office.'"
The alternative scenario is perhaps more troubling. The House has
historically defined its quorum more leniently than the Constitution's
definition, which requires a majority of the body.' 41 Currently, House
precedents hold that a quorum is a majority of those "chosen, sworn and
living.' 4' In an extreme scenario, if only five members of Congress
survived an attack, three of these surviving members could convene and
elect a new Speaker, who could then bump the Secretary of State and
become President for the remainder of the term.42  While this is an
unlikely scenario, would we feel secure in a President who had been
elected by twenty members of the House, or fifty, or 100, or even 200?
IV. CONCLUSION
The place of congressional leaders in the line of succession is troubling
for both constitutional and policy reasons. "43 However, approaching the
problem by paying attention to the different ways Presidential succession
is triggered has advantages. The Constitution contemplates that
succession may take place in the case of the death, removal, incapacity,
resignation, or failure of the President to qualify. 44  Some of these
scenarios cause more severe constitutional and policy problems than the
134. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4 ("[W]hen vacancies happen in the representation
from any state, the executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such
vacancies.").
135. CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 1, at 6-7.
136. Id. at 7.
137. Id. at 8.
138. Id.
139. Amar & Amar, supra note 3, at 135. A President pro tempore might be elected
faster as gubernatorial appointments would replenish the Senate more quickly.
CONTINUITY OF Gov'T COMM'N, supra note 1, at 6.
140. CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 1, at 8.
141. Id. at 9.
142. Id. at 2.
143. See generally Amar & Amar, supra note 3, at 135.
144. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
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case of the death of the President and Vice President. 45 In some
situations involving the failure to qualify, it may be a viable alternative to
have leaders of Congress ascend to the Presidency, such as the case
where both the President elect and Vice President-elect are killed before
Inauguration Day, or when no one can claim victory due to an election
controversy.146
Overall, differentiation between various causes for succession may
encourage Congress to consider removing congressional leaders from the
line of succession in many instances. 47 However, short of this result, it
may open the door for Congress to tailor solutions for different types of
succession crises. Furthermore, it may force Congress to face the
political reality that important actors in Congress might not want
congressional leaders to be eliminated entirely from the line, but would
perhaps accept that congressional leaders be either removed or have
1411their role scaled back in the most troubling cases.
145. Presidency Continuity Hearing, supra note 7.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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